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JURY SENTENCING IN NONCAPITAL
CASES: A CASE STUDY OF EL PASO
COUNTY, TEXAS
ROBERT A. WENINGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Question of Jury Sentencing
In the archetypical Anglo-American criminal justice system, the
judge determines the sentence, even in a jury trial.' Yet there are
important exceptions. In most states that currently sanction capital
punishment, the jury decides whether to impose the death penalty,
mandatory life imprisonment, or some lesser penalty.' Only eight
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Law, University of Chicago, for reviewing an earlier draft of this Article. Any errors
that remain are, of course, the author's alone. The views expressed are his, and not
necessarily those of the American Bar Foundation.
1. See HARRY H. KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 301 n.1
(1966) (stating that the jury usually does not determine penalties); WAYNE R.
LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1092 (2d ed. 1992) (asserting
that the trial judge is most commonly the sentencer).
2. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 301 n.1. The procedure for sentencing in
capital punishment cases varies from state to state. Some statutes dictate a death
penalty for the commission of certain offenses unless the jury recommends life im-
prisonment. Under such a statutory scheme, the recommendation returned by the
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American states, chiefly in the South, provide statutory frameworks
allowing the jury to determine sentences in noncapital cases.3 Texas
defendants, whether convicted upon a trial4 or a guilty plea,5 may
elect to have their sentence assessed by either a judge or a jury,
including the question of prison versus probation. 6
The justification for jury sentencing in capital cases is apparent.
Statutes that assign to juries the choice between life and death re-
flect the policy that the judge should not bear the sole responsibility
for making this grave decision.7 Especially at a time when capital
jury may be only advisory. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp.
1993). A sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole may be im-
posed by the court if the jury cannot agree on punishment within a reasonable delib-
eration time. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (1986 & Supp. 1992). In Arizona,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, the court alone imposes the sentence. ARIz, REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987 & Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1989).
3. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-103, 16-90-107 (Michie 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.055(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §H 97-3-67, 97-3-71
(1972 & Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 926-928 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 40-20-104, 40-20-107 (1990); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (West 1981
& Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Michie 1990); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.84.
In most of these eight states, the power of the jury to sentence is couched in
general terms, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Michie 1990), although in Missis-
sippi the jury is the sentencing authority only in particular cases delineated by stat-
ute, see Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-67, 97-3-71 (1972 & Supp. 1993) (permitting jury
sentences in statutory rape and rape cases). The various jury sentencing procedures
also differ in other particulars. In some states, the judge has the power to fix the
punishment in the event that the jury does not include a sentence in its verdict, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-107 (Michie 1987), if the jury does not agree on a punish-
ment, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990), or
where the jury fixes a penalty in excess of the maximum allowed by law, e.g., OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 928 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
4. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, §§ 1(b), 2(b) (West 1981 & Supp.
1993).
5. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.14 (West 1989).
6. See infra note 37 for a discussion of Texas probation law.
7. Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 969 (1967) [hereinafter
Jury Sentencing in Virginia].
In Jells v. Ohio, 498 U.S. 1111 (1991), Justice Marshall discussed a defendant's
waiver of a right to jury sentencing, stating:
[A]s we have recognized, the jury operates as an essential bulwark to 'prevent
oppression by the government.' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968) .... [O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in mak-
ing ... a selection [between life imprisonment and death for a defendant con-
victed in a capital case] is to maintain a link between contemporary community
[Vol. 45:3
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punishment is hotly debated,8 a death sentence should be the deter-
mination of a group of twelve lay persons chosen at random from
the widest population. Arguably, this compelling reason for jury
punishment does not apply in noncapital cases, where the decision
to incarcerate - although serious - is less grave than the decision
to inflict the death penalty.
Critics of jury sentencing in noncapital cases complain that jurors
are less competent or qualified than judges to decide questions
about probation or incarceration.9 Thus far, however, views on jury
values and the penal system.' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)...
quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
Id. at 1114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
However, in Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640 (1989), a capital case, the
Supreme Court noted that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing
even when the sentence turns on specific findings of fact. The key is that the rele-
vant sentencing factor, an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime
in Hildwin, is "not an element of the offense, but instead is a sentencing factor that
comes into play only after the defendant has been found guilty." Id. at 640 (quoting
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)). See also Tom C. Clark, The
American Jury: A Justification, 1 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 4 (1966) ("the jury... adds a
humanistic touch to the law relaxing it at times so as to allow a more equitable
judgment"); Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial,
11 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 113, 114 (1987) ("Twelve members of the community have
struggled to make the ultimate moral choice: Should this person live or die?"). See
generally J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH's BLACKSTONE 683 (1959) (upholding the jury as
the guardian of public justice and freedom from oppressive government).
8. See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recogniz-
ing a First Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355,
355 (1993) (citing the ongoing debate concerning the pros and cons of the death
penalty); Philip R. Nugent, Note, Pulling the Plug on the Electric Chair: The Uncon-
stitutionality of Electrocution, 2 WM. & MARY BILL Ras. J. 185, 185 (1993) (same).
9. Commentators have consistently favored judge sentencing over jury sentenc-
ing. See Charles 0. Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J.
369, 376 (1956) (arguing that jury sentencing is less equitable and less uniform than
judicial sentencing); Comment, Consideration of Punishment by Juries, 17 U. CHr. L.
REV. 400, 408 (1950) (arguing that the authority to impose punishment should rest
with the trial judge); Erwin Fleet, Sentencing the Criminal-A Judicial Responsibil-
ity, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 369, 370 (1986) (maintaining that sentencing belongs in
the hands of the trial judge); James P. Jouras, On Modernizing Missouri's Criminal
Punishment Procedure, 20 U. KAN. Crrv L. REv. 299, 301 (1953) (arguing that a
judge is better able to assess a criminal penalty); Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra
note 7, at 1001 (advocating abolition of jury sentencing); H.M. LaFont, Assessment
of Punishment-A Judge or Jury Function?, 38 TEx. L. REv. 835, 848 (1960) (assert-
ing that judges do a better job of assessing punishment in noncapital cases than
juries do); Charles S. Potts, Suggested Changes in Our Criminal Procedure, 4 Sw.
L.J. 437, 447-48 (1950) (asserting that judges should assess criminal penalties); SOL
RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 145-51 (2d ed. 1973) (arguing that jury
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sentencing in noncapital cases have rested largely on speculation,
not on empirical evidence.
B. The Early History of Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases
At common law, sentencing power resided in the judge.' 0 Over a
century ago, when a minority of American jurisdictions turned to
juries to determine punishment, various justifications were ad-
vanced for taking sentencing power away from the judges. 1 Since
lay persons occupied many court benches in colonial America, there
was no substantial difference between judges and jurors in terms of
competence, training, and experience. 2 Also, early settlers of the
colonies were apprehensive of the judges appointed to preside over
colonial courts, in part because some settlers experienced harsh
treatment at the hands of royal courts in England during political
and religious prosecutions under the Stuarts. 3 Early Texans simi-
larly feared the judges appointed by Spanish monarchs to preside
sentencing is less equitable and less uniform than judicial sentencing); Note, Statu-
tory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1154-57
(1960) (advocating abolition of jury sentencing) [hereinafter Statutory Structures];
Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing-Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw. L.J. 221,230 (1960)
(advocating abolition of jury sentencing).
10. Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 7, at 301 n.1. See also The King v.
Wilson, 100 Eng. Rep. 1134, 1134 (1791) (holding that the authority to impose pun-
ishment should rest with the trial judge); The King v. Bunts, 100 Eng. Rep. 368, 368
(1788) (same).
11. See Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 7, at 970-71 (citing jury sentencing
in the United States as a reaction to harsh penalties imposed by English judges in
the colonies and to early distrust of a centralized government); Statutory Structures,
supra note 9, at 1155-56 (same).
12. Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 7, at 970; Statutory Structures, supra
note 9, at 1155. See ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNC-
TIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION 27 (1958) ("In the early years of this coun-
try... [m]any members of the bar and indeed many judges had little or no legal
learning, and few requirements of any sort were made of the pioneer judges").
13. Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 7, at 970, 988. See Harold M. Hyman
& Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE JURY SYs-
TEM IN AMERICA 21, 24-30 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975) (tracing the development of
juries in pre-Revolution America); SAMUEL W. MCCART, TRIAL BY JURY: A COM-
PLETE GUmE TO THE JURY SYSTEM 11 (2d ed. 1965) (tracing the development of
juries in the United States); John V. Singleton, Jury Trial. History and Preservation,
32 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 273, 273-76 (1988) (same); VANDERBILT, supra note 12, at
17-18 ("One of the grievances on which the colonists united in declaring their inde-
pendence from the mother country concerned the royal control of colonial judges.").
[Vol. 45:3
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over their courts. 1 4 Moreover, many citizens of the newly formed
United States feared centralized government and distrusted the
judges appointed to courts created under the Constitution. 5
Opponents of lay punishment argue that the justifications for jury
sentencing advanced centuries ago no longer exist.' 6 They observe
that judges generally are better educated, trained, and experienced
than lay persons, and now are often directly elected by the general
public.17 They contend that although the fear of an arbitrary and
oppressive judiciary may have been warranted in colonial America,
such concern is unfounded today.
18
C. The Study
This Article reports the results of a field survey of jury sentencing
in noncapital cases in El Paso County, Texas,' 9 a jurisdiction where
a defendant may choose whether a judge or a jury will impose pun-
ishment. The survey consists of two parts. The first is a qualitative
analysis of policy issues concerning jury sentencing. It is based on
personal interviews with each of the eleven trial judges who then
presided over criminal cases in the district courts of El Paso
County.20 The second part is a statistical analysis of actual
14. Betts, supra note 9, at 370; Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 7, at 970
n.6; LaFont, supra note 9, at 836.
15. Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 7, at 970-71.
16. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, Preface to 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE
SEARCH FOR REFORM at xi (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter PANEL
REPORT].
17. In Texas, district judges are elected for four-year terms. TEX. CONST. art. V,
§ 7 (amended 1987). See also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 52-53
(1986); PETER DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILrrY 6-35 (1980).
18. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 158-62 (demonstrating that "the jury by
and large does understand the case and get[s the evidence in criminal jury trials]
straight").
19. For a description of the setting in which the research took place, see infra
notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
20. The author conducted personal interviews in January 1992 with each of the
judges of the eleven district courts in El Paso that then heard criminal cases, as
follows: William E. Moody, 34th District Court; Mary Anne Bramblett, 41st District
Court; Eduardo Marquez, 65th District Court; Robert D. Dinsmoor, 120th District
Court; Guadalupe Rivera, 168th District Court; Peter S. Peca, Jr., 171st District
Court; Sam W. Callan, 205th District Court; Sam M. Paxson, 210th District Court;
Herb Marsh, Jr., 243rd District Court; Phillip R. Martinez, 327th District Court; Jose
J. Baca, 346th District Court. Most interviews were tape-recorded. The tapes and
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sentences imposed by El Paso judges and juries on convicted de-
fendants in a random sample of 1,395 noncapital felony prosecutions
commenced in the district courts during a 4-year period.2
The author interviewed the El Paso judges to ascertain their views
concerning policy issues relating to jury sentencing. An examination
of judicial attitudes toward lay punishment provides a useful way of
learning about this subject not only because judges are experienced
written notes generated by these interviews are on file in the manuscripts section of
the Texas Tech University School of Law library. When conducting these interviews,
the author informed the judges that their remarks might later appear in print but
that they would not be identified by name. The author also conducted personal
interviews of a limited number of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys. See
infra notes 46 and 49.
21. The four years that formed the basis for the statistical part of this study were
1974-77. These years were used because data collected from them had been used as
the basis for the author's pre-post study of the district attorney's policy purporting to
ban plea bargaining in El Paso County, which was implemented in late 1975. See
Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. Rv. 265 (1987), for the author's pre-post study.
There were nine district courts in El Paso County during the years 1974-77. Two
of the nine district courts, presided over by Judges Jerry Woodard and Sam Callan,
were in charge of the criminal docket and handled no civil cases. Judge Woodard
was appointed in 1969 and presided over the 34th District Court. Judge Callan was
appointed in 1973 and presides over the 205th District Court. The judges of the
seven other district courts heard primarily civil matters but presided over criminal
trials when needed to alleviate caseload pressures on the two criminal judges. It is
estimated that approximately three or four full time judges heard criminal cases dur-
ing the years under study. Sam W. Callan, An Experience in Justice Without Plea
Negotiation, 13 LAw & Soc'y Rnv. 327, 341 (1979). Judges Woodard and Callan
had primary responsibility for hearing criminal cases until October 27, 1978, when
the criminal docket was divided among all the district courts of the county.
The district clerk maintains a court file for each felony prosecution in El Paso
County. These files are numbered in the order that indictments are returned by a
grand jury. The sample included every fourth file opened during the years 1974-77.
Information concerning the 1,395 cases in the random sample was gathered through
the application of a 70-item questionnaire to each case. Two law student research
assistants completed the questionnaire on the basis of court files kept by Eddie
Rubalcaba, the District Clerk for El Paso County. Court files contain copies of all
pertinent documents that the district clerk receives and provide a source of official
information concerning each felony prosecution.
At the same time, with the cooperation of William Rodriguez, then chief of police,
and Michael P. Davis, then sheriff, about six individuals employed in the records
sections of the police and sheriff's departments completed the questionnaire on the
basis of official investigative reports kept in those departments concerning the cases
in the sample. These reports contain information of the kind not usually found in
court files and are regularly made part of the prosecutor's case files. Police and
sheriff's departments were used as sources of the reports because the district attor-
ney did not make his case files available for this research.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/3
JURY SENTENCING
in sentencing, but also because they preside over jury trials and thus
are close observers of those cases in which defendants elect lay per-
sons to set penalties. The interview data revealed a sharp division of
opinion among judges over the practice of jury sentencing in non-
capital cases.
The interviews were informal, did not follow a set format, and
produced anecdotal data. This part of the investigation is qualitative
and, unlike the statistical analysis of actual sentences imposed by
judges and juries, is not a scientific survey. Its value lies not in its
ability to measure data by rigorous scientific standards, but to illu-
minate policy questions concerning the soundness of jury
sentencing.
The statistical (or quantitative) analysis is comparative, measuring
the performance of the jury against the performance of the judge.
In particular, this part of the study investigates whether sentences by
juries differ from those by judges with respect to severity and varia-
bility. Sentence severity is examined in light of two factors: the
length of prison terms and the use of incarceration over probation.
Sentence variability is examined by focusing on variations in the
length of periods of confinement.
The study employed multivariate regression analysis and con-
trolled for variables which sentencing researchers have consistently
found to produce strong effects on sentences - criminal history,
offense of conviction, type of conviction (guilty plea or trial), and
various indicators of offense seriousness.' The multivariate analy-
sis permitted the prediction, for certain offenses, of differences be-
tween the average length of sentences imposed by judges and juries.
Tables and diagrams display the statistical findings that jury
sentences are both more harsh and more dispersed than judge
sentences. Tables also display the finding that the differences be-
tween the length of average sentences imposed by the two authori-
22. See infra note 88 for an enumeration of the indicators of offense seriousness
which were controlled for in this study. The Panel on Sentencing Research (PSR)
identified the primary factors that affected sentencing: "Using a variety of different
indicators, offense seriousness and offender's prior record emerge consistently as the
key determinants of sentences. The more serious the offense and the worse the
offender's prior record, the more severe the sentence." See PANEL REPORT, supra
note 16, at 11. The National Research Council established PSR in 1980 to review
the research on sentencing, assess its quality, and suggest directions for further re-
search. Its members represent a variety of academic disciplines and methodological
approaches to the criminal justice system. Id.
1994]
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ties, which seem to run in the direction of greater severity by juries,
increase with the seriousness of the offense. For example, in cases
of theft, a relatively minor offense, jury sentences exceed judges'
sentences by only three months. But in cases of aggravated rape, a
far more serious crime, the study finds jury sentences, on average,
fifty months longer than judge sentences. Finally, in an attempt to
make value judgments, the study explores possible reasons for what
appears to be the greater severity and variability of jury punishment.
These findings relate to the goal of achieving uniformity in the
sentencing of similarly situated offenders. But the findings also re-
late to questions about the qualifications of the jury as a sentencing
authority. Recent critics of the jury raise questions about its compe-
tence as a decision-maker in a variety of contexts,' and the findings
23. Early research credited the jury as generally competent and responsive to
the evidence presented at trial. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 158-62.
More recently, the jury has been criticized for its lack of competence. See Douglas
W. Ell, Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation
and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REv. 775, 776 (1978) (asserting that juries
are inappropriate mechanisms for the determination of facts in complex civil suits);
Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?,
70 F.R.D. 199, 208 (1976) (same); Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L.
REv. 486, 489 (1975) (same).
Critics of the jury have voiced doubts about the ability of juries to analyze com-
plex data logically and to return verdicts based on evidence rather than on irrelevant
considerations. In his August 7, 1979, address to the Conference of [State] Chief
Justices, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed concern that
the information and legal issues facing jurors are too complex to permit a competent
finding of fact. JoE S. CECIL, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 5 (1987).
Some critics of the jury have advocated a due process exception to the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial based on the complexity of the case being tried.
E.g., Ell, supra at 798-99.
In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970), the Supreme Court suggested
that courts should consider the practical abilities and limitations of juries in deter-
mining whether an issue is of a legal nature, and therefore triable by jury. Some
courts interpreted this footnote to imply a complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D.
59, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that Ross footnote 10 only restates a court's tradi-
tional equity powers); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D.
Wash. 1976) (holding that Ross footnote 10 constitutionally limits the breadth of the
Seventh Amendment).
Other critics advocate the creation of specially-qualified juries or expert nonjury
tribunals. Mark A. Nordenberg & William V. Luneburg, Decision-making in Com-
plex Federal Civil Cases: Two Alternatives to the Traditional Jury, 65 JUDICATURE
420, 423-30 (1982).
[Vol. 45:3
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of this study may add to the store of information bearing on the
controversy over the merits of the jury system.
The study may also raise new questions about the practice of al-
lowing juries to fix penalties: In sentencing, do juries view evidence
of the defendant's behavior in a different light than judges? Are
jury sentences consistent with modem theories of punishment?24
As a practical matter, do jury sentences impact the size of inmate
populations25 and the crisis of prison overcrowding?26 Answers to
these questions might provide a basis for deciding whether this
mode of assessing criminal penalties ought to be retained.
D. The Research Setting
El Paso County is a crime-conscious, 7 medium-sized jurisdiction
24. For a discussion of various theories of punishment, see infra notes 65-76 and
accompanying text.
25. With 44,022 inmates in its state prisons on December 31, 1989, Texas ranked
third among all states, behind California and New York, in the size of its prison
population. During 1989, the size of the Texas prison population increased 8.9%.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990,
at 607 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1991) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK].
26. One federal district court found the conditions of confinement in the Texas
prison system to be constitutionally inadequate. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115,
1126 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court's finding that Texas prison conditions
impose cruel and unusual punishment on prisoners while in custody).
27. The sentencing of offenders in El Paso, perhaps more so than in many com-
munities, has been kept in the limelight by the two local newspapers, candidates for
public office, and the attention given the district attorney's purported ban on plea
bargaining. For a discussion of sentencing policies and practices in El Paso, includ-
ing public attitudes toward the practices, see Weninger, supra note 21, at 268-69. See
also Howard C. Daudistel, On the Elimination of Plea-Bargaining: The El Paso Ex-
periment, in WILLIAM F. MCDONALD & JAMES A. CRAMER EDS., PLEA-BARGAIN-
ING 57 (1980). Professor Daudistell noted the attention given to sentencing by
newspapers and groups of concerned citizens:
Throughout the early 1970's, El Paso was called the burglary capital of the
United States. Newspapers and citizen action groups called on the law enforce-
ment community to get tough on burglars. Home owners were made fearful by
rumors (some of them true) of murders committed by young illegal aliens from
Mexico while they burglarized homes. Persons living in some sections of the
city expressed their fears in community meetings and said they could be victim-
ized easily by Mexican burglars who were able to stake out homes from hilltop
lookouts only one-half mile away in Mexico.
Id. at 61. See also Callan, supra note 21, at 330-31 (asserting that judges "became
the whipping boys of the press and of an irate public" for granting probation as
punishment in burglary cases).
During interviews, the judges noted that El Paso citizens have increasingly shown
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
in Texas. 8 Jurisdiction over felony cases, as in other Texas counties,
vests exclusively in the district courts,2 9 which also have authority to
hear the more significant civil matters. 0 Jurisdiction over misde-
meanor cases is allocated between county,3 ' municipal,3" and justice
of the peace courts.33 In 1992, when the judges were interviewed,
eleven district courts heard criminal cases in El Paso County.34
Texas used a system of indeterminate sentencing during the pe-
riod of the study.35 Under this scheme, judges and juries exercised
vast discretion in fixing prison terms. Statutes classified felony of-
fenses into different degrees of seriousness with varying ranges of
allowable punishment. 6 Initially, upon election of the defendant,
concern over newer forms of criminal behavior such as gang violence and drive-by
shootings. See supra note 20 for background on the interviews conducted by the
author. Judges also said that they are well aware of their accountability to the elec-
torate for their sentencing practices. Most judges said that as a result of negative
characterizations by the media, they are concerned that the public views their
sentences as too lenient.
28. El Paso, the fourth largest city in Texas, is the major city in El Paso County.
In 1990, the population of the city was 515,342, and the population of the county was
591,610. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POP.
ULATION: GENERAL POPULAnON CHARAcrERISTCS, TEXAS 7, 38 (1990). Situated
on the international border, El Paso lies across the Rio Grande River from Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico, a city with a population of 797,679. The population of El Paso in-
cludes people of various ethnic backgrounds. In 1990, Hispanics comprised 69.6%
of the county's population; "Anglos," (all whites excluding Hispanics) 25.6%;
Blacks, 3.5%; and all other nonwhites, less than 2%.
29. TFx. CONST. art. V, § 8 (amended 1987); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
4.05 (West Supp. 1993).
30. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 8 (amended 1987); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 24.007,
24.008 (West 1988).
31. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 16 (amended 1987); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
4.07 (West Supp. 1993).
32. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 4.14 (West Supp. 1993).
33. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 19 (amended 1987); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
4.11 (West Supp. 1993).
34. See supra note 20.
35. The statute on indeterminate sentences in Texas provided:
If the verdict fixes the punishment at confinement in an institution operated by
the Department of Corrections for more than the minimum term, the judge in
passing sentence shall pronounce an indeterminate sentence, fixing in such sen-
tence as the minimum the time provided by law as the lowest term in an institu-
tion operated by the Department of Corrections and as the maximum the term
stated in the verdict.
TEx. CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.09, § 1 (West 1979) (repealed 1981).
36. In Texas, a first-degree felony is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a
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the judge or the jury chose prison or probation37 and determined a
sentence within the statutory range. But almost everyone under-
stood that only rarely would the offender serve the entire sentence.
Through its parole release decision, and within the limits of the stat-
ute,38 the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles determined the ac-
tual period of confinement, which was generally much less than that
originally assessed.
In El Paso County, sentencing practices in noncapital cases are
rather unique. When the defendant elects to plead guilty and be
punished by the judge, a recommendation made by probation of-
ficers under a set of voluntary sentencing guidelines,39 which in El
Paso County has become known as the "point system,"40 influences
term of 5 to 99 years, and the judge may also levy a fine of up to $10,000. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (West Supp. 1993). The range of punishment for a sec-
ond-degree felony is 2 to 20 years, and the judge may also levy a fine of up to
$10,000. Id. § 12.33 (West 1974). A third-degree felony is punishable by imprison-
ment for a term of 2 to 10 years, and the judge may also levy a fine of up to $10,000.
Id. § 12.34 (West Supp. 1993).
37. In Texas, the law governing a probationary sentence varies substantially de-
pending on whether the judge or the jury assesses punishment. Either sentencer is
allowed to grant probation, but only a judge may grant probation to a defendant
with prior felony convictions. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 4(c) (West
Supp. 1993). However, only a jury may grant probation when it is shown that the
defendant either used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the
felony offense with which the defendant is charged (or during immediate flight
therefrom). Id. § 4(a). Similarly, only a jury may grant probation when a defendant
is found guilty of capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggra-
vated sexual abuse, or aggravated robbery. Id.
38. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15(b) (West 1979) (repealed 1981,
current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 23 (West Supp. 1993)).
39. A sentencing guidelines system articulates policy as to customary lengths of
incarceration. The idea that judges might use guidelines in sentencing is an out-
growth of the concept, developed by the Federal Parole Board in the 1970s, that
parole officials should follow set standards in making release decisions. See gener-
ally DON M. GoTrFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 13-
19, 119-27 (1978) (providing the seminal framework for parole and sentencing guide-
lines). A sentencing guidelines system assumes that judges should have sentencing
discretion, but that their discretion should be structured and controlled without
eliminating the opportunity for individual case consideration. Id. at 1.
40. Under Texas law, a judge's sentencing decision is informed by a presentence
report which is prepared by probation officers. The report contains information
bearing on the "criminal record, social history and present condition of the defend-
ant." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 9 (West Supp. 1993). The judges of
El Paso County make special use of probation officers in sentencing.
In 1975, the two judges then handling the criminal docket, Judges Callan and
Woodard, devised a set of voluntary sentencing guidelines (the "point system")
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the sentence pronounced by the judge. Following indictment of a
defendant, probation officers use these guidelines, without consult-
ing either prosecution or defense counsel, to calculate a sentence
based on the accused's prior record and the seriousness of the
offense.4'
which have been administered by probation officers from the West Texas Commu-
nity Supervision and Corrections Department since 1978. See Callan, supra note 21,
for a discussion of El Paso County docket administration. Under this system, proba-
tion officers, upon defendant's indictment, ascertain the nature of the offense and
investigate the defendant's background and prior record. Using an easily calculated,
additive scoring system, they assign points to such indicators as offense, use of vio-
lence, amount of injury to victim, and nature and extent of the offender's prior rec-
ord. The total number of points assigned a defendant governs both (1) the initial
decision to either imprison or grant probation and (2) the determination of the pe-
riod of incarceration. Materials prepared by the West Texas Community Supervi-
sion and Corrections Department describing the operation of the sentencing
guidelines are on file in the manuscripts section of the Texas Tech University School
of Law library.
The guidelines used in El Paso County categorize offenses and offenders on a
one-dimensional scale. The author previously described this scale with respect to his
pre-post study:
Most jurisdictions with guidelines use a matrix with two axes to articulate sen-
tencing policy. On one axis is a ranking of offenses according to their serious-
ness; on the other is a criminal history score for rating the offender's prior
record. Within the grid are cells that classify cases on the basis of these factors
so that offenders falling within the same subgroup are seen as fairly homogene-
ous and deserving of similar sentences. Even a two-axis matrix is subject to the
criticism that it may not take into account particular combinations of variables
and may not reflect contingent patterns of decision making. A single scale, such
as El Paso County's, specifies sentencing criteria in far less detail.
Weninger, supra note 22, at 288.
41. Many of the guidelines used by judges and parole boards in other jurisdic-
tions have been developed on the basis of empirical information. Typically, data
collection and modeling efforts are undertaken to capture the policy implicit in ex-
isting sentencing practices or to ascertain the likely impact of projected changes. For
a discussion of conceptual and methodological problems associated with the con-
struction of empirically-based sentencing guidelines, see Richard F. Sparks, The
Construction of Sentencing Guidelines: A Methodological Critique, in 2 RESEARCH
ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 194 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
Empirical analysis, though it can result in more informed planning, played no role
in the development of the El Paso County point system, either when it was created
in 1975 or thereafter. When the guidelines were first devised, Judges Callan and
Woodard agreed to certain normative propositions about the goals of a rational sen-
tencing policy. See Callan, supra note 21, at 331-32 (adopting, as a judge, the per-
sonal conviction that sentencing should "prevent the convicted criminal from
engaging in criminal behavior in the future ... let the control fit the criminal").
Using their judgment and experience, the two judges simply wrote guidelines reflect-
ing that agreement. Id. at 335-36. Subsequent revision of the point system occurred,
similarly, without the benefit of empirical analysis.
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Guideline sentences under the El Paso County point system apply
only to defendants who plead guilty and elect to be sentenced by the
judge. In such cases, probation officers make sentence recommen-
dations to judges concerning both the initial decision to either im-
prison or grant probation and the length of the prison sentence. If
the guidelines indicate that the defendant should be incarcerated,
the probation officer recommends a specific term of confinement
which is included in a presentence report that is transmitted to the
judge. Since the guideline system lacks legal force, the judge is free
to modify the sentence recommendation or ignore it altogether.
Usually, at a pretrial hearing, the defendant is informed of the
judge's decision regarding the sentence that would be imposed if the
accused pleaded guilty, and then the case is set for trial or entry of a
plea.42
Under the bifurcated trial procedure now used in Texas,4 3 in cases
where the defendants insist upon their right to a jury trial, the jury
first determines guilt or innocence. Upon a conviction, if the de-
fendant has also elected jury punishment, the same jury sets the
penalty in a second proceeding at which the defense presents addi-
tional evidence of the defendant's character, reputation, and crimi-
nal history.'
It is not surprising that defense attorneys45 and prosecutors46 in
42. While the guideline sentences recommended by probation officers apply
only to defendants who plead guilty and elect judge sentencing, the interview data
suggests that such sentence recommendations may influence judges who have been
elected to sentence offenders convicted by juries. Applying the guidelines system to
jury sentencing, however, would interfere with a defendant's right to elect that a jury
assess punishment. For the Texas statutes empowering a jury, upon defendant's
election, to assess punishment, see supra notes 4-5.
43. Texas is among those jurisdictions which have established a two-phased trial
procedure in criminal cases. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (West Supp.
1981). For a comparison of the former single-trial procedure and the two-phased
trial procedure, see William G. Reid, The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 44
TEX. L. REv. 983, 1010 (1966).
44. The Texas statute provides that evidence of "the prior criminal record of the
defendant, his general reputation and his character" may be presented by the State
and the defendant at the trial on punishment. TEX CODE CRrM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.07.3(a) (West Supp. 1993). But the evidence to be offered at a trial on punish-
ment need not be limited to defendant's character, general reputation, and prior
criminal record. Id. Any evidence that is relevant to an application for probation is
admissible. Id.; see also Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. Crim. App.
1967).
45. The author did not conduct a scientific survey of the El Paso County criminal
defense bar regarding lawyer practices or attitudes toward jury sentencing. How-
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El Paso divide over the soundness of the law allowing the accused a
right to choose who will assess punishment. Defense counsel view
the accused's election as a desirable means of avoiding those judges
who sentence too harshly.47 Prosecutors, on the other hand, view
the right to choose as providing the defendant with an unjustified
opportunity to forum shop in an effort to escape deserved
punishment.48
The accused's right of election sharpens the focus on the penalty
patterns of El Paso judges and juries. Defense attorneys, to assist
their clients in making the sentencing choice, attempt to learn the
track records of individual judges for assessing punishment. They
also attempt to predict, based on their knowledge of comparable
cases in which juries have sentenced, the probable range within
which lay persons might set penalties.49
The bench, too, displays a keen interest in jury sentences, but per-
haps for different reasons. Judges believe that lay sentences reflect
community attitudes toward penalty standards, which jurors may
consider in determining punishment. But judges may also believe
that the balance between guilty pleas and jury trials will be upset if
their sentences are perceived to be more severe than those of juries.
Therefore, one question is whether the shorter sentences given by
judges suggest greater severity on the part of jurors, or whether
courts are not really more lenient than lay persons but are simply
ever, valuable background information on this subject was obtained through per-
sonal interviews conducted in January 1992 with five attorneys who specialize in
representing criminal defendants in El Paso: Norbert J. Gamey, John D. Gates,
Dolph Quijano, Jr., Michael R. Gibson, and Arvel Ponton, II. These interviews
were open-ended, conducted without the use of a questionnaire, and tape-recorded.
The tapes and written notes generated by the interviews are on file in the manu-
scripts section of the Texas Tech University School of Law library.
46. The author also obtained useful information concerning jury sentencing from
prosecuting attorneys in El Paso. Personal interviews were conducted in January
1992 with eight of the nearly thirty assistant prosecutors employed in the office of
Steve W. Simmons, then District Attorney of El Paso County. These interviews
were open-ended and did not follow a set format. Tape recordings were made of
most of the interviews and are on file in the manuscripts section of the Texas Tech
University School of Law library.
47. See infra note 49.
48. See supra note 46.
49. Whether the perceived advantage of the defendant's election proves to be
real or illusory depends, of course, on whether predictions of judge and jury
sentences can be made correctly. Prosecutors and defense attorneys agreed that
judge sentences were far more predictable than jury sentences. See supra note 46.
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responding to institutional concerns such as the pressure of the trial
docket and a desire for guilty pleas. Jurors, free of caseload pres-
sures, are likely to think about the punishment a defendant deserves
without paying much attention to the mode of disposition, and are
not likely to give a guilty plea discount.5 0 Perhaps, then, judges are
not really more lenient than lay sentencers but simply let juries set
the "price." Courts may then reduce the price set by the jury to
induce defendants to waive trial." Possibly, if judges think only
about the merits - if they were considering only the penalty the
defendant deserves - they might sentence not much differently
than juries.
E. The Limitations of the Study
The research reported here centers on jury sentencing in El Paso
County, and therefore possesses the limitations of any study which
focuses on only one community. 2 Also, "sample bias" may result
from the fact that in Texas, criminal defendants elect whether to be
sentenced by a judge or a jury. Every case in the sample submitted
to a jury for punishment apparently represents one in which the de-
50. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
51. See infra Table 2; see notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
52. PSR expressed a wide variety of particular concerns with the methodology
used in statistical studies of sentencing. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 69-125. In
particular, generalizing from a study of a single jurisdiction may be problematic
since it is likely that communities vary in their attitudes toward crime and punish-
ment. PSR observed that studies of criminal courts have repeatedly demonstrated
that jurisdictions vary substantially as to both norms of appropriate sentencing (e.g.,
levels of harshness) and standard operating procedures. Id. at 78.
Public attitudes about crime and punishment also depend upon demographic fac-
tors. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Of-
fenders: An Analysis of the Public's View, 14 LAW & Soc'y RFEv. 223, 239-43 (1980)
(surveying public attitudes about appropriate sentence lengths, the authors com-
pared sentences assigned by different demographic groups and found that sentences
were influenced by such variables as sex, race, religion, marital status, education,
income, occupation, and age). Women, for example, sentence less severely than
men. Id. at 239. Whites sentence more severely than Blacks. Id. Protestants and
Catholics sentence similar to one another, but Jews and persons with no religious
affiliation are much less severe. Id. at 240. Persons with no secondary education are
more severe than persons with some secondary education. Id. at 241-42. In terms of
occupation, the least severe sentences are given by service workers, housewives, and
unemployed persons. Id. at 242. The most severe sentences are given by profes-
sional/managerial, production/nonsupervisory, and retired persons. Id In terms of
income, low income persons assign milder sentences than high income persons. Id.
at 242-43.
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fendant (or, more probably, the defendant's lawyer) predicted that a
jury sentence would be more lenient than a judge sentence. Con-
versely, every case in the sample submitted to a judge for punish-
ment represents one in which the defense predicted that a court
sentence would be more lenient than a lay sentence. In these cir-
cumstances, even though the study controlled for those variables
that researchers consistently find produce strong effects on
sentences,5 3 one cannot assume that the two samples of judge- and
jury-determined sentences are reasonably matched and that the
study is free of selection bias.
Further, the statistical analyses reported in this Article examined
sentence severity in light of only two factors - the length of prison
terms and the use of incarceration over probation - and examined
sentence variability by focusing only on variations in periods of con-
finement. Conclusions regarding overall sentence severity and vari-
ability depend on a complex assessment of additional factors, such
as decisions to charge, trial practices, and the use of sentence types
other than prison or probation - to name only a few - and neces-
sarily await further research.
It is important to mention these limitations. But it is also impor-
tant not to exaggerate their effects. First, the author believes that
the research reported here identifies questions which might arise
whenever the jury determines sentences in noncapital cases. Sec-
ond, the study is not intended to assess the overall severity of sen-
tencing in El Paso County, but to focus on jury behavior in assessing
punishment. Moreover, since this is a comparative study of legal
decision-making, measuring the performance of two sentencing au-
thorities, the research provides a window through which one might
view not only juries at work, but judges as well.
II. INTERVIEwS OF JUDGES
A. Judicial Attitudes and Policy Issues Concerning Jury
Sentencing
The interviews of judges raised issues that touch directly on the
jury's competence to perform the sentencing function. The debate
between judges on these questions was fascinating and threaded
with difficult value judgments. On one hand, some argued that
53. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also infra note 88 for those
indicators of offense seriousness which were controlled for in this study.
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judges, because of their education, recurrent experience in sentenc-
ing, and knowledge of the criminal justice system, are better able to
fix criminal penalties than lay persons. But others defended lay sen-
tencing, arguing that the jury is greater than the sum of its parts, and
that what it lacks in professional training it makes up in common
sense and experience. These judges maintained that lay persons are
well qualified to sentence offenders because they are drawn from
the local community and therefore mirror public attitudes toward
crime and punishment.
B. The Jury's Lack of Recurrent Experience in Sentencing
Judges regularly participate in the criminal justice process
whereas jurors assemble for the purpose of deciding a single crimi-
nal action and therefore have no recurrent experience in sentencing.
Arguably, because judges routinely examine evidence of criminal of-
fenses, they react more professionally, and less emotionally, than in-
experienced lay persons.54 One judge stressed that because of their
continuous involvement in the criminal justice process, judges, un-
like juries, are able to assess the sentence of one defendant in light
of the punishment imposed on similarly situated offenders:
I think judges when they assess punishment are much more
familiar with similar cases and other fact settings. I think
judges are in a better position to gauge that type of crime, that
type of setting, that type of defendant's culpability with other
defendants' similar situations to give a more rational punish-
ment. Jurors hear only one case and are much more subject to
being emotionally taken away on some high cloud and having
tunnel vision whereas I think judges are much more apt to com-
pare that situation with other situations.55
Most judges agreed that their recurrent experience in sentencing
enables them to assess punishment more rationally than jurors. But
a few disagreed, suggesting that their constant exposure to evidence
of criminal behavior might actually make them callous or "case-
hardened" at the sentencing stage. One judge said:
I still have faith in the system in that twelve randomly se-
lected representatives of the community are the heartbeat or
the pulse of the attitudes of the community. I'm not sure what
54. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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the one word is that describes all that, but I guess I believe in
the system that is trial by your peers.
And we're only human, the judges sitting on the bench, and
we inevitably and undoubtedly will eventually become case-
hardened or at times may react not only because of the facts in
the case presented to us but because of other factors in our
lives, whatever might be happening at that moment. You might
have read a real bizarre article in the newspaper about some
child abuse case and then you sit on the bench and have to pass
sentence on an individual who's been charged and found guilty
of sexual assault on a minor or something. I think the judge is
going to find himself susceptible to all of those other pressures
whereas I hope that the jury, being twelve randomly selected
individuals, are going to be more reflective of current attitudes
and whatever the present morality of the community is.56
In this judge's opinion, the jury's lack of recurrent experience in
sentencing is actually an advantage in assessing punishment: Lay
persons bring a fresh perception to this stage of the criminal justice
process, avoiding stereotypes that might infect the judicial eye.
C. Jury Sentencing and the Trial Tariff
Consider the judge's point that court sentences might be affected
by pressures to which lay persons are not susceptible. One such
pressure may be that of the trial docket, possibly resulting in a "trial
tariff' or "guilty plea discount" whereby judges sentence defendants
convicted at trial more harshly than those who pleaded guilty. Stud-
ies of other populations found that defendants who concede their
crimes are sentenced more leniently than trial defendants. 7
56. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does it Pay to Plead Guilty?
Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAWv & Soc'Y
REV. 45, 69 (1982) (affirming the tenet that defendants are sentenced more leniently
if they plead guilty); Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, A Plea is No Bar-
gain: The Impact of Case Disposition on Sentencing, 60 Soc. Sci. Q. 218, 218 (1979)
(stating that the legal community assumes as a given that the defendant receives a
reduced charge or a more lenient sentence if the defendant pleads guilty). But two
studies cast doubt on the proposition that defendants who plead guilty are sentenced
more leniently than trial defendants. See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB,
FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 269-70
(1977) (asserting that if examiners "consider not only the type of disposition but also
the offense on which a person is convicted, his personal characteristics, the strength
of the case against him, and the identity of the courtroom workgroup that sentenced
him, the effect of dispositional mode is insignificant in accounting for the variance in
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Whether perceived as a reward for a plea of guilty or as a penalty
for the exercise of the right to a trial,5" sentence differentials are of
sentence length"); WILLIAM M. RHODES, PLEA BARGAINING; WHO GAINS? WHO
LOSES? at IV-6 to IV-8 (1978) (asserting "there were few large [sentencing] differ-
ences between trial cases and guilty plea cases"). For commentary on various stud-
ies that have examined the issue of differential sentencing, see Douglas A. Smith,
The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949 (1986).
58. The concept of a sentencing differential was justified during the 1970s by two
prestigious legal authorities, the American Bar Association and the American Law
Institute, on the theory that although it is improper to penalize a defendant for exer-
cising the right to trial, it is appropriate to reward a defendant for waiving this right
and pleading guilty. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3(3)
(Proposed Official Draft 1975); STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY
§ 1.8(a) (1968); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14.18(b) (2d ed. 1979).
The distinction between rewarding the waiver of a right and penalizing the exer-
cise of the same right was accepted by Chief Judge William Campbell, who once
wrote: "[I]t is incorrect, in my opinion to say ... that a 'more severe sentence' is
imposed on a defendant who stands trial. Rather, it seems more correct to me to say
that the defendant who stands trial is sentenced without leniency . . . ." United
States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1960); accord United States v. Ra-
mos, 572 F.2d 360, 363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978) (Lumbard, J., concurring); Fielding v. Le-
Fevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Rodriguez, 429 F. Supp.
520, 524 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bar-
gain Justice," 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 509,519-20 (1979) (asserting that, although plea
bargaining should result in less than theoretically correct sentences, judges in reality
possess wide discretion in sentencing); Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64
MINN. L. REv. 669, 698-99 (1980) (stating that it is morally impermissible to penalize
a defendant with a more severe sentence for failure to cooperate with authorities);
Peter Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REv. 471,489 (1978) (observing that it is difficult to prove that
a prosecutor overcharged because courts defer to prosecutorial discretion).
The Supreme Court, however, has questioned whether a principled distinction can
be drawn between reward and penalty. In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552,
555 (1980), a trial judge mentioned a drug dealer's refusal to name his suppliers as
one circumstance that the judge considered in sentencing. The defendant apparently
conceded that a sentencing judge properly could reward a defendant's guilty plea
but argued that a failure to volunteer information should not be regarded as justifi-
cation for enhancing his sentence. Id. The Supreme Court responded:
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing" the
punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the "leniency" he
claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The question for decision is
simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is relevant to the currently un-
derstood goals of sentencing.
Id. at 557 n.4.
Judge Bazelon referred to the implausibility of the distinction when he observed,
"if we are 'lenient' toward [defendants who plead guilty], we are by precisely the
same token 'more severe' toward [those pleading not guilty]." Scott v. United
States, 419 F.2d 264,278 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF
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doubtful constitutionality. They encourage guilty pleas by making it
costly for an accused to claim his constitutional right to an adver-
sarial procedure.59 When convicted following a jury trial, the de-
fendant is effectively punished twice: once for the crime and then
again for "enjoy[ing] the right to ... trial.., by an impartial jury."60
Moreover, the existence of such differentials likely dissuades other
defendants from exercising their right to trial.
During the interviews, one judge adverted to the possible exist-
ence of trial tariffs or guilty plea discounts in El Paso:
I know that a judge could be a sort of demigod on behalf of
his constituents and say, so to speak, that whenever anyone
goes to trial I'm going to give him the maximum and make peo-
ple afraid to go to trial. That's a bad thing and there's no doubt
that it's a worry. Jury sentencing keeps judges from taking ven-
geance on people who go to trial.61
The conclusion that there would be no trial tariffs or guilty plea
discounts if juries always determined punishment makes sense.
Judges suffer from caseload pressures because they are regular par-
ticipants in the criminal justice process and face crowded trial dock-
ets. But juries, convened only for the purpose of deciding a single
criminal action, have no dockets and are not subject to caseload
pressures. Therefore, one likely advantage of jury sentencing is that
defendants convicted upon a jury trial are not punished more
harshly for seeking an adjudication of guilt.
D. Sentencing on the Basis of Extraneous Factors
The Panel on Sentencing Research reported that "[u]sing a vari-
ety of different indicators, offense seriousness and offender's prior
JUSrICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1977) (stating that although
not widely accepted as proper, courts penalize defendants who forego plea bargain-
ing and are convicted at trial); Malvina Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles in
the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanc-
tioning the Plea Bargaining Process, 73 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,2, 8 n.42 (1982)("[D]efendants are threatened with harsh penalties if they go to trial and are prom-
ised more lenient sentences if they plead guilty."); Note, The Influence of the De-fendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 220 (1956)
[hereinafter Influence of Defendant's Plea] (asserting that "whether by means of
forfeiting a reward or incurring a penalty, a demand for trial will result in a more
severe punishment than would be imposed following a guilty plea").
59. Influence of Defendant's Plea, supra note 58, at 221.
60. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
61. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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record emerge consistently as the key determinants of sentences.
The more serious the offense and the worse the offender's prior rec-
ord, the more severe the sentence." 62
The interview data, however, suggests that the sentences imposed
by jurors may be influenced by considerations far removed from of-
fense seriousness and the offender's prior record. Judges critical of
jury sentencing argue that extraneous factors, such as appeals to
emotion, the skill of counsel, and the defendant's appearance and
demeanor at trial often improperly effect the sentencing decisions of
lay persons. One such judge said:
Judges, if there's anything in the world judges learn, is that
you cannot judge by appearances. The appearance of the de-
fendant - his facial features, his expression, his mannerisms,
his personal merits - have more to do with jury sentencing
than does anything else. And that's just a totally unreliable ba-
sis for sentencing. A jury cannot help but consider these things
because really that's all they know - they just judge everybody
by appearances.
They also judge from a different standpoint. A jury judges
from the lawyers. In sentencing, a judge doesn't pay any atten-
tion to the lawyers. I mean he listens to what they say, but in
terms of being emotionally moved by them a judge simply can't
be, because he's just seen too much. For if they really try to
appeal to him, other than by just logic, they put him off, irk
him. But jury reaction to lawyers is much different than a
judges. 63
As an example of extraneous factors which may affect jury pun-
ishment, another judge cited the sentencing of a defendant con-
victed of aggravated rape in a case involving particularly offensive
behavior. At the punishment hearing, the defense attorney called
the defendant as a witness. On the stand, the defendant appeared
contrite, "admitted his sins," and requested that the jury assess a
probationary sentence. The defense attorney also called the defend-
ant's priest as a witness, who supported the defendant's request for
leniency. The jury granted probation. In his interview, the judge
who had presided over the trial opined that the sentence was exces-
sively lenient and based entirely on emotion, appearances, and law-
yer ingenuity. The judge said that without jury sentencing, those
62. See PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 11.
63. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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factors would have had no effect and the defendant would have re-
ceived a long prison terma
E. The Purposes and Theories of Punishment
There are diverse theories of punishment 65 that have at one time
64. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of various theories of punishment, see generally JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 3-12 (1987) (discussing theories of
punishment based on such goals as utilitarianism, retributivism, and denunciation);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 23-27 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing theories of punishment based on such goals as prevention, restraint, re-
habilitation, deterrence, education, and retribution).
One's view of jury sentencing may depend on the assumptions made about the
normative goals of sentencing. If these goals are the utilitarian ones of preventing
crime (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), sentences are justified on the
basis of predictions of future crime and rehabilitative potential. Individualized sen-
tencing is appropriate in pursuit of utilitarian aims. The rehabilitative goal, for ex-
ample, prescribes sentence variation based on offender characteristics - lengthy
confinement for some offenders but not others. It may be questioned whether juries
are either competent enough or provided with adequate information to sentence
offenders in light of utilitarian goals.
Jury sentencing might be appropriate if the purpose of sentencing is retributive
and sentences are determined on the basis of the seriousness of the offender's crimi-
nal conduct, personal culpability, and the harm done or risked. But it is important
to note that the retributive aim also requires similar punishment for similar cases.
See also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66-
67 (1976) ("Severity of punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of
the wrong."). See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THm FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73-
76 (1974) ("[T]he maximum of punishment should never exceed the punishment
'deserved."'); JAMES F. STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAV OF ENoLAND
75 (1883) (describing early justifications for retributive punishment); JAMES Q. WIL.
SON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 209 (1975) (discussing the retributive nature of the
death penalty); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN
NATURE 497 (1985) ("punishment is... often justified simply on the grounds that it
is just, not on the grounds that it is effective"). But see Gerhard O.W. Mueller,
Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58, 68-70 (1966) (asserting
that mankind has generally outgrown the retaliatory phase and bridled its retributive
urge).
PSR noted the enactment of determinate sentencing statutes during the 1970s.
Under these statutes, prisoners could predict their release dates at the time of sen-
tencing assuming good behavior in prison. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 2. De-
terminate sentencing is associated with the retributive theory of punishment,
commonly put forward under the rubric of "deserts" or "just deserts," which is gain-
ing currency today. See FRANcis A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL 67 (1981) (asserting that the retributive theory of punishment addresses the
concept of moral responsibility); Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribu-
tion-An Examination of Doing Justice, Wis. L. Rav. 781, 814-15 (1976) (advocating
a cautious and humble embrace of the retributive theory of punishment); LAFAvE &
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or another enjoyed enthusiastic support. Currently, there is wide-
spread disagreement over the normative goals of sentencing and
over which of those goals are appropriate in individual cases.6 6
Also, theories sometimes conflict6 7 and, depending on their relative
priority in a particular case,' might suggest alternative sentences for
the offender.69 Viewed in this light, a proper sentence may depend
first on assumptions made about the normative goals of sentencing
and, second, on whether the sentencing authority is competent to set
penalties consistent with the theory of punishment appropriate for
the particular offender.
In interviews, however, judges were divided over the importance
of a knowledge of sentencing theory. One judge criticized jury sen-
tencing because lay persons generally lack an understanding of the
goals of punishment:
The jury is not familiar with the purposes and theories of
punishment, and in a trial it would be hard to educate them or
give them any degree of sophistication as to really what all is
involved. Sentencing is a very complicated undertaking.
What's really needed is an emphasis on the theory and practices
of sentencing. What is a reasonable reaction of the law to this
particular person under all the circumstances?
For instance, I think that most people's attitude toward sen-
tencing is merely a question of social vengeance. (Emphasis ad-
ded). The only thing wrong with that is that other than keeping
down a certain amount of vigilante and vengeance crime, social
vengeance serves no purpose whatever to control crime. What
controls crime - the only thing that I know of - is imposing a
responsible control on as high a percentage of the criminals in a
society as is possible. And then the question of what is a re-
Sco-r, supra, at 28-29 (asserting that the popularity of the retributive theory of
punishment is in response to the perception that the rehabilitative theory of punish-
ment has failed).
PSR reports that although there has been a strong shift away from indeterminate
sentencing and rehabilitation as a goal of punishment, there remains widespread
disagreement over the purposes of sentencing. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 5.
PSR states that decision-makers - legislators, judges, and parole officials - are
rarely "purely utilitarian or purely retributive." Id.
66. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 5.
67. See PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHmENT 44-46 (1981).
68. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401 (1958).
69. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 4.
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sponsible control for any given defendant, it may be a guess on
the part of a judge, but it's an educated guess and it's only a
wild guess on the part of the jury.7 °
On the other hand, another judge discounted the need for an
awareness of the normative goals of sentencing. This judge favored
jury punishment, suggesting that imposing a criminal penalty was
simply a visceral reaction to the seriousness of a defendant's
behavior:
I don't think punishment is based upon theories of law or
theories of the criminal justice system. Basically, to me, punish-
ment is a gut feeling. What do you think this person deserves as
punishment for what he has done? (Emphasis added).
And factored in there is any consideration whether or not
there's any rehabilitation that will work - not is there rehabili-
tation out there but whether or not it will work to some degree.
There are not many success stories in the criminal justice sys-
tem, but there are some, and I believe judges and juries need to
try to make those success stories and consider rehabilitation.
But I really think it's a gut feeling. Take a look at the defend-
ant, listen to what the complainant had to say, and the wit-
nesses, and decide what punishment ought to be meted out.71
The two judges flatly disagree over what a competent sentencing
authority ought to know about theories of punishment. But note
their possible accord as to the goals pursued by sentencers. The first
judge says that juries, because they lack understanding of other sen-
tencing goals, seek retribution or "social vengeance." The second
judge views sentencing as a matter of assessing the punishment the
offender "deserves" for what he has done. Both judges seem to be
referring to the "just deserts" goal to inflict suffering on the of-
fender commensurate with the harm caused to another.72
Assume that such a theory of sentencing - a just deserts model
- dominates in an individual case. If the aim of the criminal law is
to impose deserved punishment on the offender, is the jury compe-
tent to perform the sentencing function? An answer to the question
may depend on the determinants of a proper sentence under a re-
tributive theory of punishment.
70. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 65,
for a discussion of the theories of punishment.
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Under a retributive or just deserts model of punishment, the ap-
propriate penalty is determined retrospectively by the nature of the
criminal act, its seriousness, the offender's personal culpability, and
the harm done or risked by the offender.73 Arguably, if the jury is
qualified to draw inferences concerning guilt or innocence, it is also
competent to draw inferences concerning these penalty factors be-
cause they raise factual issues similar to those which are regularly
resolved on the basis of evidence in the record by lay persons with-
out special training or experience. If so, there is no reason why ju-
rors could not properly determine punishment commensurate with
the seriousness of the wrong.
But a just deserts model does not tolerate variations in the
sentences of offenders guilty of crimes with the same degree of seri-
ousness.7 4 The retributive goal, if it is to avoid arbitrariness, re-
quires that all offenders be measured by the same standard and that
there be like sentences in like cases. Sentences fall short of this aim
if jurors, because of their unguided discretion, irregular participa-
tion in the criminal justice process, or any other reason, return dif-
ferent sentences for similarly situated offenders.
On the other hand, if the goals that ought to have priority in sen-
tencing are the utilitarian ones of rehabilitation, incapacitation, or
deterrence, questions persist as to whether the jury is competent to
fix penalties. In contrast to a retributive sentence, utilitarian pun-
ishment requires the sentencer to engage in a predictive function
and prospectively determine the effects of the penalty on the of-
fender and on future crimes in general.75 A concern for the goal of
deterrence, for example, requires the sentencer to determine how
effective fear of punishment is as a restraint upon violations of the
law by the general public.76
Arguably, the task presented to the jury if it sentences under a
utilitarian theory differs significantly from the traditional duty it
performs in its role at trial as the finder of historical fact. It may be
questioned whether the jury is able to evaluate behavioral effects of
punishment or whether it can be presented with the information
73. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 4-5.
74. VON HIRSCH, supra note 65, at 45-55, 66-67.
75. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 4-5.
76. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3-4 (1971) (dis-
cussing the theory of simple deterrence and how it affects potential criminals).
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necessary to make judgments in territory so uncharted for lay
persons.
F. Sentence Disparity
Sentence disparity is more accurately measured quantitatively. A
major statistical finding of this study, presented below, is that jury
sentences suffer from more dispersion or variability than judge
sentences. But the interview data reported here is still useful be-
cause it provides a background against which the quantitative re-
search can be interpreted and offers a possible explanation for the
conclusion that juries are more erratic than judges in sentencing.
Disparity typically implies that defendants in like cases are sen-
tenced differently; that is, equally situated offenders are treated
unequally.77 A lack of uniformity in punishment offends fundamen-
tal notions of fairness and raises questions concerning the compe-
tence of the sentencing authority.
The judges related copious evidence of unjustified disparity in
jury sentences. Almost every judge told his or her favorite story of
how a particular jury determined a sentence far outside the range of
what might have been reasonably anticipated punishment. One
77. See PArL REPORT, supra note 16, at 72. PSR distinguished between four
types of disparity, stating that each needed to be evaluated differently. "First, there
may be only the appearance of disparity. This occurs when cases seem alike to an
outside observer but differ materially in case attributes observed by the judge." Id.
at 75. For example, one defendant might exhibit remorse while another, otherwise a
like offender, does not. This seeming disparity may be reduced by observation of
additional variables that affect sentencing. Id.
The second type of disparity is that which is deliberately introduced as a matter of
social policy. Id. For example, assume it has been decided that it is sufficient to
single out and punish only one of several tax evaders. Id. Such disparity may be
unjust to one who espouses equal treatment for like offenders, but may be tolerated
by one who believes that "'like' offenders are entitled only to an equal opportunity
of receiving a particular sentence." PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 75.
Third, there is "interjurisdictional disparity such as that found between urban and
rural courts in the same state." Id. Such geographical disparity may be the product
of differences in community attitudes toward crime and punishment. Whether such
disparity is warranted depends on one's "concern for evenhandedness or uniformity
of standards versus the value of preserving local community control." Id.
A fourth type of disparity relates to individual judges whose differences in sen-
tencing are explained by their varying philosophies, experiences, and backgrounds.
Id. at 76. Some observers might tolerate such disparity as a reflection of acceptable
variation in attitudes toward sentencing within a community. Id. Others might de-
plore such variation as inequitable, inconsistent with the rule of law, and undesirable
because "judge shopping" may result. Id. at 77.
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judge cited a case in which several defendants had been convicted
for their part in a gang rape. Jury penalties ranged from a two-year
suspended sentence for the offender who initiated the attack to a
forty-year prison term for an offender who appeared to be the least
culpable of those charged.7 8
Another judge cited a case of four brothers who were jointly
charged with murder but had separate jury trials (two defendants in
one trial, two in another). The four brothers grew up in the same
family, were closely grouped in age, and lacked serious criminal his-
tories. Although the juries convicted all four, it appeared that two
of the four were primarily responsible for the offense. Nevertheless,
while one jury assessed sentences of thirty and thirty-two years on
the two offenders who appeared more culpable, the other jury as-
sessed terms of fifty-seven years for each of the two who seemed
less culpable.79
Judges stated almost unanimously that juries sentence offenders
much more disparately than judges, primarily because lay persons
bring no experience to the task of sentencing and bear no continuing
responsibility for it. Recall the interview statement of the first-
quoted judge who observed that while "jurors hear only one case,"
judges are able to assess punishment for one offender in light of the
penalties they set for others." The judge is almost certainly correct
in his belief that the greater dispersion in sentences by juries is ex-
plained by their inability to make sentencing decisions on a compar-
ative basis.
G. Jury Sentencing and Compromise Verdicts
The Texas Legislature established the two-phased trial procedure
to lessen the incidence of compromise verdicts - guilty verdicts
supported by jurors who disagree that the state has carried its bur-
den of proof but who vote to convict based on an agreement to im-
pose a low penalty.8'
78. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1979) ("the risk of an
unwarranted conviction ... cannot be tolerated"); Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra
note 7, at 986-87 (same); Statutory Structures, supra note 9, at 1156 ("[I]t can hardly
be maintained that the jury can completely separate its guilt-finding from its sen-
tence-assessing functions.").
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Although bifurcation is superior to the former Texas procedure
whereby the jury determined guilt and punishment in a single pro-
ceeding,' the two-phased trial does not entirely eliminate the risk
of a compromise verdict. Because the same jury sits at both pro-
ceedings, the danger remains that the prospect of imposing a low
penalty at the second stage will persuade some jurors to vote to con-
vict even though they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt to
a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt.8 3
During interviews, the judges were divided over whether the two-
phased trial prevented compromise verdicts. Some believed that the
new procedure worked well and that jurors diligently followed the
court's instructions to make independent determinations on the is-
sues of guilt and punishment. Others maintained that despite sepa-
rate proceedings, jurors found it too difficult to decide both issues
without impinging upon a defendant's right to be acquitted unless
the prosecution proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 4
Despite the apparent split among judges regarding the two-
phased trial, the survey generated only soft data on this subject.
Judges who doubted the effectiveness of the two-phased trial related
no concrete observations of compromise verdicts, only hunches and
suspicions. They tended to be tentative in their interview responses,
probably because the jury deliberates in secret during each stage of
the proceedings, making hard evidence of illicit agreements very dif-
ficult to obtain.8"
III. THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
A. Sentence Length and Variability
For each of seven offenses studied, the statistical analysis com-
pared the sentences of judges and juries as to both severity (initially,
as indicated by the length of prison terms) and variability (variations
in the magnitude of prison terms). The mean sentence length (X)
measures sentence severity and the standard deviation (S) measures
sentence variability.86
82. See supra note 43.
83. Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 7, at 968-87.
84. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
86. The mean sentence length (.Y) is the simple arithmetic average, computed by
adding the lengths of all sentences and dividing by the number of sentences. See,
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Diagram 1 illustrates the results of this preliminary examination.
It depicts by judge and jury the spread around the mean for each of
the seven major offenses. In the diagram, values for mean sentence
lengths appear at the base of each vertical column as well as at a
midpoint within the column. Values for standard deviations appear
at the base of the column.
Comparing the statistics shown in Diagram 1, one finds greater
severity and variability in jury sentencing for almost every offense in
the study. An offense-by-offense comparison of mean sentences
shows that juries imposed longer prison terms for all offenses except
armed robbery. A comparison of standard deviations reveals more
dispersion in jury sentences for all offenses except theft.
Diagram 1 also presents a graphic view of the severity and varia-
bility of the two kinds of sentences. As for severity, the darkened
part of each vertical column represents sentence length measured by
the mean sentence for the offense. In other words, the taller the
darkened part, the longer the duration of imprisonment for that of-
fense. As for variability, the entire vertical column, including dark-
ened and undarkened parts, represents the range between the
shortest sentence and the value one standard deviation below the
longest sentence. The taller the entire column, the more scattered
the sentences for that offense. From this perspective, it is evident
that jury sentences were more variable for every offense in the
study. It is also evident that juries imposed longer sentences for all
offenses except armed robbery.
The analysis displayed in Diagram 1 did not control for prior
criminal record or offense seriousness. Without controlling for
these variables, the longer jury sentences might be explained by the
special characteristics of those cases which resulted in jury trial, such
as offense behavior or criminal history of a more serious nature.
Also, the initial analysis did not control for the type of conviction,
i.e., guilty plea or trial. Without controlling for this variable, longer
jury sentences might be explained by the trial tariff: harsher
sentences imposed on defendants who contest their guilt.'
e.g., MORRIS HAMBURG, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR DECISION MAKING 24 (5th ed.
1991).
The sample standard deviation (S) measures the dispersion of sentence lengths
around the mean sentence length. Id. at 49-50. Hence, the larger the standard
deviation, the larger the sentence variability.
87. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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DIAGRAM 1
Sentence Spreads by Offense and Sentencer
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Because of the ambiguous results in the initial analysis, mul-
tivariate regression analysis was used to re-examine the data, con-
trolling for the type of conviction (guilty plea or trial), criminal
history, and certain "seriousness indicators." 8 An interaction
model was used to test whether juries react more than judges to the
special characteristics of a case. The analysis also permitted a deter-
mination of whether the greater variability in jury sentences oc-
curred by chance or by jury reactions to specific aspects of the case.
Regression analysis confirmed the preliminary finding of greater se-
verity and variability in jury sentences.
Although the regression analysis confirmed the initial findings,
the reality is more complicated than suggested by a preliminary view
of Diagram 1. Looking at the linear impact of the jury sentencing
variable, one first sees no significant difference in severity between
judges and juries. This suggests that the marked differences in sen-
tence lengths depicted in the diagram are explained by the trial
tariff. Regression analysis, however, confirmed the earlier finding
of greater jury severity as depicted in Diagram 1. It also revealed
that a positive and significant interaction effect existed between the
jury sentencing variable and the variable measuring offense serious-
ness. In practical terms, this means not only that juries imposed
longer prison terms for all offenses, but also that differences be-
tween judge and jury sentences, running in the direction of greater
jury severity, increased as offenses became more serious. Table 1
displays this interaction effect.
88. The "seriousness indicators" included the following: offense of conviction;
mean sentence imposed for that offense; number of prior arrests; number of prior
penitentiary commitments; sex of offender and victim; race of offender and victim;
age of offender; use of a weapon; amount of money stolen; number of perpetrators;
whether the offense was committed in the victim's home; and the seriousness of any
injury to victim.
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TABLE 1
PREDICTED SENTENCING DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN
JUDGES AND JURIES, BY OFFENSE
OFFENSE
Sale of Possession
Controlled of a
Aggravated Substance Controlled
Rape Robbery (Group 1) Substance Burglary Theft
Length of
Sentencing 50 41 20 12 7 3
Differential months months months months months months
It should be emphasized that Table 1 displays not predicted
sentences for the indicated offenses, but predicted differences be-
tween average lengths of sentences imposed by judges and juries for
those offenses.89
As for repeat offenders, the analysis shows that when only recidi-
vists were examined, the judge-jury differences are even larger than
those depicted in Table 1. As for the first-time offenders, the analy-
sis reveals a somewhat different pattern. Although juries sentenced
first offenders more severely than judges, juries distinguished be-
89. The following multiple regression equation was used to predict the sentenc-
ing differentials reported in Table 1:
Sentence = -8.6 + .79A + 13.3B + 2.83C + 19.6D - 12.2E + 7.OF - 7.1G +
16.2H - 12.2J + .86K
where A = offense seriousness (F=5.64; 3=.12)
B = Does the defendant have prior penitentiary commitments?
(0 = no; 1 = yes) (16.0; .14)
C = Number of prior arrests (31.4; .20)
D = Was defendant convicted by a jury?
(0 = no; 1 = yes) (6.83; .28)
E = Did defendant plead guilty?
(0 = no; 1 = yes) (2.7; -. 18)
F = Was the crime committed at the victim's home?
(0 = no; 1 = yes) (9.44; .09)
G = Was the victim Hispanic?
(0 = no; 1 = yes) (10.53; -. 10)
H = Was the victim seriously injured?
(0 = no; 1 = yes) (17.7; .13)
J = Did the jury sentence the defendant?
(0 = no; 1 = yes) (10.9; -. 18)
K = Offense seriousness x Did the jury sentence the defendant? (27.5;
.35)
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tween such offenders as to the seriousness of their offenses. Juries
actually imposed shorter prison terms on first-time offenders con-
victed of the more serious offenses than on those convicted of less
serious offenses. But the leniency shown this subset of offenders
was exceptional - juries generally punished first offenders more se-
verely than judges.
B. Use of the Prison Sanction
The severity of a sentencing authority must be gauged not only by
the length of its sentences, but also by its use of the prison sanction
- the decision to incarcerate rather than grant probation. Table 2
compares judges with juries in their use of imprisonment as a pen-
alty. It displays probation rates by type of conviction (guilty plea or
trial) and by prior criminal record (first offender or repeat
offender).'
TABLE 2
PROBATION RATES FOR JUDGES AND JURIES, BY
CRIMINAL RECORD AND MODE OF
DISPOSITION
Judges Juries T-Value
Guilty Plea Cases
First Offender .90*** .68*** 3.62
(193) (34)
Repeat Offender .61 .59 .26
(230) (47)
Trial Cases
First Offender .59 .69 -. 83
(22) (59)
Repeat Offender .18 .25 -1.09
(62) (169)
Levels of Statistical Significance:
*** .001
90. The statistics reported in Table 2 should be viewed with caution because the
Texas statute governing probation varies substantially with whether judge or jury
imposes punishment. See supra note 37. A more strict approach to assessing the use
of the prison sanction was not undertaken because of methodological difficulties in
disentangling the effects of the additional variables stemming from the complexity of
the statute.
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Table 2 presents only slight evidence that juries were more severe
than judges in deciding between incarceration or probation. It
shows that the jury's greater use of the prison sanction is statistically
significant only in guilty plea cases involving first offenders. It also
shows that in trial cases, although the differences are not statistically
significant, juries sentence less severely than judges.
But the data suggests questions which relate to a possible institu-
tional preference of judges that defendants waive their right to
trial.91 In guilty plea cases, might judges, by imposing a lower rate
of imprisonment, be discounting the price set by juries for defend-
ants waiving their right to an adjudication? In trial cases, might
judges, by imposing a higher rate of imprisonment, be inflating the
price to make defendants pay for contesting their guilt?
As for discounting jury sentences in guilty plea cases, Table 2
shows that judges were a little more lenient than juries toward re-
peat offenders (probation rates of 61% versus 59%) and much more
lenient toward first offenders (probation rates of 90% versus 68%).
Arguably, the greater leniency shown by judges to defendants who
plead guilty is to be expected if jurors sentence "on the merits" and
judges do not.
Similarly, it is possible that in trial cases judges might inflate the
price set by juries, adding an extra penalty for a defendant's choice
to go to trial. However, since there is a right of election in both
guilty plea and trial cases, defendants could undercut such a strategy
simply by choosing jury sentencing whenever they contest their
guilt. Therefore, since judges are likely to be aware of such a re-
sponse by defendants (and take it into account in setting penalties),
one might expect that greater judge-jury differences would appear
in guilty plea than in trial cases.
Table 2 shows that judges prescribed more severe sentences than
juries on trial defendants (probation rates of 59% versus 69% for
first offenders; 18% versus 25% for repeat offenders). Arguably,
the greater severity of judges suggests that, to penalize those who
contested their guilt, judges increase the price set by juries. Also
note that judge-jury differences are greater in guilty plea than trial
cases. Again, such a result is what might be expected if judges'
sentences were influenced by the considerations set forth above.
91. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The research reported here measures the performance of the jury
against that of the judge with respect to the severity and variability
of sentences in felony cases in El Paso County, Texas. A compari-
son of actual sentences of the two sentencing authorities shows that
juries imposed longer and more variable prison terms than judges.
Regression analysis predicted differences between the average
lengths of sentences imposed for certain offenses. These differ-
ences, running in the direction of longer sentences by juries, in-
creased with the seriousness of the offense.
What do these findings signify? There are at least four main is-
sues. The first is whether longer jury sentences reflect public senti-
ment that judges treat offenders too lightly. Second is whether
public sentiment can serve as a reasonable basis for determining
sentencing policy. Third is whether the sentencing practices of juries
are consistent with the retributive or just deserts theory of punish-
ment that is currently re-emerging.92 Fourth is whether the jury is
competent as a sentencing authority.
Do longer jury sentences mirror a community belief that judges
sentence offenders too leniently? It would seem that the answer is
yes. The public call for crime control through longer prison
sentences is heard everywhere. Previous studies show that the pub-
lic wants longer sentences than those actually imposed by the crimi-
nal justice system. 93 Jurors are a cross-section of the public, and it is
92. See PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 2 (describing the trend toward deter-
minate sentencing statutes). See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
93. The public is increasingly critical of perceived judicial leniency in sentencing.
Timothy J. Flanagan et al., Public Perceptions of the Criminal Courts: The Role of
Demographic and Related Attitudinal Variables, 22 J. REs. CRIME & DELINO. 66, 66
(1985). Opinion polls in the United States and Canada suggest that most members
of the public would like their criminal courts to be more severe. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUsTICE STATISTICS 256-58 (Edward J. Brown
et al. eds., 1983). Polls conducted by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center
between 1972 and 1980 found the percentage of respondents who said their courts
were too lenient in sentencing increased from 66% in 1972 to 83% by 1980. Id. at
258. Other polls have indicated that the public attaches serious consequences to this
perceived leniency by courts. A 1981 poll conducted by the Gallup Organization
found that 20% of the respondents believed leniency by the court was the single
most important cause of increasing crime rates in the nation. Id. at 229. Similarly, a
1982 Gallup poll found that 36% of the respondents believed that more severe pun-
ishment could reduce recidivism rates of released prisoners. Id. at 264. A 1989 Gal-
lup poll found that 83% of the respondents felt that the courts in their area did not
deal harshly enough with criminals. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 26, at 191.
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likely that the more severe sanctions they impose reflect community
preferences.
Can public sentiment serve as a reasonable basis for developing
sentencing policy? It would seem again that the answer is yes, at
least in the sense that a just deserts policy of punishment should be
informed by some input from the general public.94 When the domi-
nant goal of sentencing was the rehabilitation of the offender, parole
officials appropriately determined the length of sentences. 95 Today,
But other studies present a different picture of public attitudes toward sentencing.
One study questioned the validity of public opinion polls depicting a perception of
judicial leniency, arguing that such surveys generally do not ask respondents to con-
sider contingencies such as offense circumstances, behavioral content of various
sentences, or fiscal cost differentials. This study found that, based on a survey of 816
Illinois residents, the public is less vengeful than typically portrayed in polls. Doug-
las R. Thomson & Anthony J. Ragona, Popular Moderation Versus Governmental
Authoritarianism: An Interactionist View of Public Sentiments Toward Criminal Sanc-
tions, 33 CRIME & DELINO. 337,337 (1987). In another study of Illinois respondents,
a group of 325 judges and lay persons were asked to impose sentences on the same
offenders in four hypothetical criminal cases. The sentences given by lay persons
tended to be equal to or less severe than those given by judges. The researchers
concluded that the public perception of judicial leniency is "fueled by both inaccu-
rate perceptions of the sentences judges imposed and distorted pictures of offenders
they sentence." Shari S. Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leni-
ency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. ScI. & LAW 73, 88 (1989).
Two Canadian scholars concluded that media coverage contributes to a public
preference for more severe sentencing by unduly emphasizing crimes of violence
and sentences of imprisonment and by providing too little systematic information
about the sentencing process or its underlying principles. Anthony N. Doob & Ju-
lian V. Roberts, News Media Influences on Public Views of Sentencing, 14 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 451, 451 (1990). These authors suggest that the inadequacy of news-
paper accounts of criminal cases is largely responsible for public dissatisfaction with
current sentencing practices. Id. at 458. They found that people who had informa-
tion similar to that available to the sentencing judge were significantly more satisfied
with the level of punishment actually imposed. Id. at 458-60. See generally Anthony
N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes To-
ward Sentencing, 16 CANAD. J. BEHAV. Sci. 269, 269-79 (1984) (discussing the im-
pact of information on public attitudes regarding satisfaction with judicial
sentencing).
Unlike the study reported in this Article, none of the research referred to in this
footnote rests on a statistical analysis of sentences actually imposed by judges and
juries.
94. Some criminal justices scholars observe that under retributive sentencing,
there are fewer guideposts for the "correct" sentence and that the public's view on
appropriate levels of punishment becomes increasingly relevant. See Alfred Blum-
stein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis of the
Public's View, 14 LAW & Soc'y REv. 223, 258-60 (1980) (asserting that sentencing
should accurately reflect public opinion).
95. PANEL REPORT, supra note 16, at 2.
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as sentencing goals shift from rehabilitation to retribution,96 it is ap-
parent that public views on appropriate levels of penalties become
increasingly relevant. 7
Are jury sentencing practices in El Paso County consistent with a
re-emerging just deserts theory of punishment? It would seem that
this question may be answered both yes and no. If the purpose of
sentencing is retributive, the punishment must be commensurate
with the seriousness of the offender's criminal conduct, his personal
culpability, and the harm done or risked.98 This study suggests that
juries, in accordance with the retributive ideal, are sensitive to de-
termining punishment in light of the seriousness of the behavior un-
derlying the offense.
But a just deserts philosophy also requires equality of treatment
for defendants with offense behavior and criminal records of a simi-
lar nature. If this study suggests a failure of jury sentencing to pro-
vide like treatment for like offenders, jury sentencing in El Paso
County may have fallen short in meeting the goals of a retributive
model of punishment.
Finally, is the jury a competent sentencing authority? Unlike
judges, lay persons generally have little or no knowledge of punish-
ment policy, sentencing alternatives, the state's correctional system,
or other matters germane to the administration of penal laws. Ju-
rors do reflect communal attitudes toward punishment, but they
lack the temperament, experience, or professional discipline of
courts. Jurors may respond to different stimuli than judges, who are
routinely exposed to unpleasant or repulsive evidence. Lay
sentencers might react emotionally to repugnant behavior, and may
be both more harsh and more erratic than judges in punishing for
such conduct.
A possible alternative to the present framework is a system which
employs mixed tribunals of judges and lay persons in making deci-
sions concerning punishment. Common in Europe (where mixed
tribunals also determine guilt or innocence), 99 such a procedure
would go far toward remedying the perceived defects of jury sen-
96. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
99. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 931, 991-92
(1983) (discussing West German trial practices).
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tencing - disparity, undue severity, ignorance of correctional alter-
natives, and ignorance of the resolution of past cases. At the same
time, the procedure may yield sentences vastly more acceptable to
the public than those determined by judges alone.1' °
If this study is found to reflect greater jury severity in assessing
punishment, it must be recognized that greater social costs are part
and parcel of allocating the sentencing function to lay persons alone.
If the jury continues to act as a sentencer, attention needs to be paid
to the problems of larger inmate populations, increased costs to tax-
payers, and greater disruption in the lives of prisoners, their fami-
lies, and society in general.
100. The mixed tribunal for making sentencing decisions has, oddly, not been
used in the United States. The advantages of using both professional judges and lay
persons are recognized by Professor Albert Alschuler, who is a proponent of the
mixed tribunal and favors its introduction into American criminal justice systems.
See Alschuler, supra note 100, at 997-1003 (discussing how mixed tribunals might
simplify American trial procedures and make them more effective).
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